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Abstract
The HR program, Colton et al. (1999), performs theory formation in domains of pure mathematics. Given only minimal
information about a domain, it invents concepts, make conjectures, proves theorems and finds counterexamples to false
conjectures. We present here a multi-agent version of HR which may provide a model for how individual mathematicians
perform separate investigations but communicate their results to the mathematical community, learning from others as
they do. We detail the exhaustive categorisation problem to which we have applied a multi-agent approach.
1 Introduction
Automated theory formation in pure mathematics involves
the production of mathematical concepts, examples, con-
jectures, theorems and proofs. Various systems have mod-
elled different aspects of theory formation. The AM pro-
gram, Davis and Lenat (1982), worked in elementary num-
ber theory and modelled how an exploratory approach can
drive theory formation. It used heuristics to guide the
search towards more interesting concepts and achieved
some success re-inventing well known concepts. The GT
program, Epstein (1988) worked in graph theory and was
the first to model the use of theorem proving to help dir-
ect theory formation. The IL program, Sims and Bresina
(1989), constructed operators with given properties over
types of numbers such as complex numbers. This mod-
elled how theory formation can be goal directed.
The AM program stopped being productive after a
while in every session. AM’s author, Lenat, argued that
this was because it needed more heuristics and the ability
to invent its own heuristics. He implemented the Eurisko
program to do this, Lenat (1983), but it but wasn’t as suc-
cessful as AM and it is debatable whether it added to our
understanding of theory formation. In Furse (1990) sev-
eral other reasons are given why AM ‘ran out of steam’.
One reason based on arguments from Kuhn (1970) is that
AM does not model any social aspect of the mathemat-
ical community. That is, creativity in mathematical re-
search often arises from the interaction of several math-
ematicians, often collaborating on the same problem but
sometimes working on different problems, possibly even
in different domains.
To our knowledge, no theory formation program in
mathematics has modelled the communication of ideas
between mathematicians. We have extended the HR pro-
gram, Colton et al. (1999), to model limited interaction
between different copies of the program running concur-
rently. This multi-agent approach has led to greater cre-
ativity in the system as a whole. In 2 we give neces-
sary background information about the HR system, fol-
lowed in 3 by details of the multi-agent implementation.
In 4 we discuss the exhaustive categorisation problem
to which we have successfully applied multi-agent theory
formation. In 5 we discuss further possibilities for this
approach, including an application to the problem of in-
teger sequence extrapolation.
2 The HR System
The HR system models the major activities of mathemat-
ical theory formation: forming concepts, calculating ex-
amples, making conjectures, proving theorems and find-
ing counterexamples. The version of HR discussed in
Colton et al. (1999) and Steel et al. (2000) is a Prolog
implementation which includes all of this functionality.
Java is a more natural language for implementing agent
based programs and the version of HR we discuss here is
a re-implementation of HR in Java which is still under de-
velopment. The Java version does not yet have conjecture
making or theorem proving abilities, so theory formation
is limited here to the compilation of concepts. HR does
this by exploring a space of concepts using a best first
search based on measures of interestingness.
The user supplies a set of objects of interest for the
domain, eg. the numbers 1 to 10 in number theory. They
also supply a set of initial concepts by providing a defin-
ition in terms of a set of predicates, the conjunction of
which defines the concept, and an exhaustive datatable
of examples calculated for all the objects of interest. For
instance, the concept of multiplication in figure 1 is sup-
plied in number theory with a datatable of examples where
the first column contains integers, which the integers in
the second and third columns multiply to give. A defini-
tion is also supplied for multiplication as a set of six pre-
dicates describing the triples in the datatable:
(i) is an integer (ii) is an integer (iii) is an integer
(iv) divides (v) divides (vi)
Theory formation proceeds in theory formation steps:
HR takes a concept already in the theory and passes it
through a production rule (detailed below) along with
a parameterisation detailing exactly what the production
rule should do. The production rule will generate the
definition and datatable of a new concept. HR then checks
whether it has a concept in the theory already with exactly
the same datatable. If it finds a match, the definition for
the new concept is added as an alternative definition to the
old concept, and the new concept is discarded. In fact, if
the new concept is less complex (as defined below) than
the original, HR replaces the original concept with the
simpler new one. If the new concept does not match one
already in the theory, it is added to the theory.
Currently HR has uses just 7 production rules. The
types of concepts they produce is described briefly below.
It is perhaps easiest to imagine that the objects discussed
are integers and the subobjects are divisors.
The exists rule produces concepts identifying objects
where there exists a subobject of a particular nature.
The forall rule produces concepts identifying objects
where all subobjects are of a particular nature.
The size rule produces functions which count the num-
ber of subobjects of a particular nature for each object.
The split rule produces concepts identifying objects
with a particular number of subobjects.
The match rule produces concepts identifying objects
with equal subobjects of a particular nature.
The negate rule produces concepts identifying objects
which have the properties described by one old concept
but not the properties of another old concept.
The compose rule produces concepts identifying ob-
jects which have the properties of two old concepts.
Note that the first five rules are called unary produc-
tion rules as they produce a new concept from only one
previous concept. The last two are called binary pro-
duction rules as they produce a new concept from two
previous ones. In figure 1 we see that to construct the
concept of square numbers from the concept of multiplic-
ation, two theory formation steps are required. Firstly, the
match production rule is used to construct the concept of
integers and their integer square roots. Secondly, the ex-
ists production rule is used to identify those integers for
which there exists such an integer square root, namely 1
and 4. For a more detailed description of the production
rules, please see Colton et al. (2000a).
The construction history of a concept is the set of
triples of (old concept, production rule, parameterisation)
which detail the steps used to build all the previous con-


















Figure 1: The construction of square numbers
struction history of a concept and the user supplied con-
cepts upon which it is ultimately based, HR can com-
pletely re-construct the concept by following the steps in
order. We say the complexity of a concept is the size of
its construction history. Even with just seven production
rules, the size of the space HR searches when forming a
theory is very large. To limit the search, we usually em-
ploy a complexity limit of between 5 and 10, ie. no the-
ory formation steps involving concepts with complexity
greater than the limit are allowed.
Each new concept formed is added to the agenda. If
a concept reaches the top of the agenda, all theory form-
ation steps involving it are carried out until it is replaced
at the top. HR can perform a breadth first search which
puts every new concept to the bottom of the agenda, and
a depth first search, which puts them at the top. Al-
ternatively, HR can perform a unary first search which
combines the breadth first and depth first searches. In a
unary first search, HR uses the unary production rules in
a depth first manner, but the binary production rules in a
breadth first manner. This means that any new concept in-
troduced is explored thoroughly with the unary rules, but
not combined with other concepts until much later.
To enable effective traversal of the space we have en-
abled HR to employ a best first search: after every step
it determines which is the most interesting concept and
moves this to the top of the agenda. HR has many differ-
ent measures available to estimate the interestingness of
a concept, as detailed in Colton et al. (2000b), and uses a
weighted sum of values calculated for a particular concept
to determine the overall worth of the concept.
We discuss only the novelty measure here. To define
this, we note that we can use the examples of a concept to
produce a categorisation of the objects of interest in the
theory. For instance, the square number concept in fig-
ure 1 categorises integers 1 to 4 as: because
and are squares, and are not. For every concept in
a theory, HR can determine the categorisation it produces
for the examples supplied by the user. The categorisa-
tion for a particular concept may not be unique and we
define the novelty of a concept to be the reciprocal of the
number of other concepts which share its categorisation.
Therefore, concepts producing categorisations unique to
them score 1 as they are novel, but concepts producing
categorisations which also belong to 99 other concepts
score as they are not novel.
3 Multi-Agent HR
Given a problem to solve, one approach is to employ a set
of autonomous programs, called agents, each with dif-
ferent abilities and tasks and each able to communicate
with the others. The set of agents forms an agency and it
is hoped that dividing tasks between the agents will im-
prove the overall efficiency of the system. Often each
agent runs on a separate processor, and improvements in
efficiency are observed as a result of the parallel attack
on the problem. For our purposes, using an agency al-
lows us to model a community of mathematicians each
performing individual investigations but communicating
their results to others.
Our implementation of an agency is fairly straightfor-
ward. Using the multi-threading capabilities in Java, we
run several copies of HR as individual threads. There-
fore our agency runs on the same processor, not on par-
allel processors, although this could easily be altered to
improve efficiency. Each agent has a different name to
identify the concepts they introduce, and each has differ-
ent settings which guide its theory formation. We also run
a ‘watcher’ program in another thread which determines
when the task set for the agency has been achieved, and
stops the agents when this is the case.
Communication between agents is limited to sending
and receiving concepts. Each agent has a set of inboxes
into which they receive concepts from the other agents,
with a different inbox for each other agent. There is no
global repository to which concepts are sent and taken,
and the user can customise each agent to control which
concepts from which inboxes it takes. It is hoped that
the communication of a concept will increase the number
of ways it is developed. For example, the binary rules
combine two concepts. As the concepts available to each
agent will be different, a concept read by one agent will
be developed differently to the way in which it will be
developed by the agent which sent it.
Each concept resides as an object of class Concept
in the Java program, and each object contains all relev-
ant information about the concept, including the inform-
ation representing the concept and the values calculated
to assess it. To communicate a concept, a pointer to the
concept is put in the inboxes of all the other agents. There-
fore, the receiving agent has access to all the information
about the concept. However, to actually read a concept
from the inbox, we force the receiving agent to recon-
struct the concept from scratch using the construction his-
tory of the concept. The disadvantage to this is the ad-
ditional time spent repeating constructions. However, as
each agent may be working with different examples from
the theory, the representation of a concept sent by an agent
may not convey all the information required by the receiv-
ing agent. For example, if one agent was working with the
numbers 1 to 10, and received a concept from an agent
working with 1 to 5, it would effectively have to construct
the concept from scratch to fill in the missing details.
As each agent measures interestingness in a different
way, an agent receiving a concept will either have to ac-
cept the judgement of the sending agent, or re-assess the
concept on its own terms. For a heuristic search to per-
form correctly, the last option is preferable, and so each
agent assesses a communicated concept itself and places
it in the appropriate place in the agenda. As some of the
measures are built up as the concept is constructed, the
simplest way for a concept to be re-assessed correctly is
to build it from scratch. Therefore, another advantage to
reconstructing concepts is that each is properly assessed
and incorporated into the theory correctly.
Each agent passes all of its concepts to the other agents.
At present, whenever an agent sends its concepts, it takes
the opportunity to read the concepts in its inboxes. This
model may change in future, as we test whether the agency
is more efficient if agents send concepts more often than
they read them. Whereas all concepts are sent to inboxes,
agents are very selective about which concepts they take
from the inboxes. The selection procedure is dependent
on the task set for the agency, so we discuss this in the
context of the problem being addressed in 4.
There are only a few settings available to the user to
fine tune the action of the agency:
The user can choose how many agents to use.
They can set the search parameters differently for each
agent, so that they perform different searches.
They can detail how each agent selects from its inboxes
- including specifying the agents it takes concepts from
and which concepts to take.
They can specify when the sending and reading of con-
cepts takes place. This is specified in terms of how
many theory formation steps occur before the agent
communicates the concepts it has found (and reads the
concepts in its inboxes).
4 Exhaustive Categorisation
When HR is asked to explore a domain it must find out as
much information about that domain as possible. In this
mode it is difficult to assess how well the program is do-
ing. Certainly it is impossible to find all the concepts in
a domain and even in a depth limited search, there are of-
ten too many concepts for a program to conceivably find
in a reasonable time limit. Also, it is very difficult to as-
sess how creative a program has been in constructing a
particular theory. The exhaustive categorisation problem
discussed here provides ways to measure the success and
creativity of a theory formation program.
4.1 Problem Description and Motivation
We say that a set of examples has been exhaustively cat-
egorised by a theory if for any possible way to categorise
the examples, there is at least one concept in the theory
which achieves that categorisation. For example, given
the integers 1 to 4 as examples for number theory, the en-
tire set of categorisations for these integers is:
Once the objects of interest supplied by the user have
been exhaustively categorised, a milestone has been passed
because the program has learned an answer to any ques-
tion of the form “Why are and the same but different
to and ”. For example, if we asked why and are
the same, but different to and , any program which had
invented the notion of square numbers could answer that
and are squares but and are not. At present, we
have achieved an exhaustive categorisation of the integers
1 to 5 using HR. This leads us to the problem description:
to exhaustively categorise the integers 1 to 6.
4.2 Measuring Success
The number of ways of categorising a set of objects is
defined as the th Bell number, Bell (1934). The Bell
numbers are: Therefore
to exhaustively categorise, say, the integers 1 to 5, HR
would need to find concepts which categorised them in 52
different ways. The number of categorisations achieved is
some measure of the usefulness of the theory formed and
hence of the success of the program.
We introduce the following way to compare two the-
ory formation systems:
Suppose systems A and B both start with the same set of
examples and perform the same number of theory forma-
tion steps. We say that is more creative than if the
theory it has produced has achieved more categorisations
of the examples than the theory produced by .
There have been entire conferences devoted to understand-
ing creativity in humans and machines,1 and we are still
far from an explanation which could be turned into con-
crete ways to measure the creativity of a computer pro-
gram. We believe that a program which produces 100
different categorisations of a set of objects in 500 steps
is more creative than one which produces only 10, and
this is how we choose to compare the creativity of agen-
cies. We certainly do not claim to have captured the very
essence of creativity with these measures. Note that be-
cause each agent must reconstruct any concept it decides
to read, these reconstruction steps count as theory forma-
tion steps. Therefore an agency does not get any steps for
free, and the creativity measure is valid.
1For example the International Congress on Discovery and Creativ-
ity, Ghent 1998.
We hypothesise that employing an agency will im-
prove the creativity of HR. We test this hypothesis in ex-
periment 1. In experiment 2, we assess whether we can
improve efficiency without losing creativity. In experi-
ment 3 we assess whether the increase in creativity of an
agency compensates for the loss of efficiency due to the
communication overheads.
4.3 Experiment 1 - Creativity
We used four agents named:
(H)ardy, (R)amanujan, (L)ittlewood and (W)right.2
Each agent worked with the numbers 1 to 6, and em-
ployed a different search strategy:
Hardy - Unary first search
Ramanujan - Depth first search
Littlewood - Best first search based on novelty only
Wright - Breadth first search
The only shared resource was the set of 203 categorisa-
tions of the numbers 1 to 6 which are calculated before-
hand. Each agent removes a categorisation from the set
if it is the first to find a concept which achieves that cat-
egorisation. The watcher records which agent found each
categorisation first.
We experimented with the criteria by which an agent
chooses concepts from its inboxes. We first allowed each
agent to read every concept produced by every other agent,
but as expected, there was so much repetition of work that
the agencies fared much worse than HR running alone. A
better alternative is to only allow concepts into the theory
which are new to the agent. However, the only way to
tell that a concept is new is to test the datatable against all
those already in the theory, which is time consuming.
Finally, we realised that for this problem, the most
natural selection procedure is to only reconstruct concepts
which produce a categorisation which is novel for the re-
ceiving agent. Because all information about a concept is
available, and the agents are working with the same set of
examples, it is very quick to check whether a concept’s
categorisation has already been found by an agent. Fur-
ther, choosing concepts with novel categorisations guar-
antees the novelty of the concept itself, and combination
with other concepts in the theory is likely to lead to yet
more novel categorisations.
To test our hypothesis we compared the creativity of
every agency possible using the four agents. These in-
cluded all agencies with one agent, named H, R, L and W,
all agencies with two agents, named HR, HL, HW, RL,
RW and LW, all agencies with three agents, named HRL,
HRW, HLW and RLW and the agency with four agents,
named HRLW. For each of the agencies with two or more
agents, we tested two copies: one with no communica-
tion at all, and one with immediate communication -
ie. after every theory formation step, each agent reported









































Figure 2: Number of categorisations achieved by agencies
after 3000 theory formation steps
new concepts and read those reported by others. We ran
each agency for a total of 3000 theory formation steps. In
agencies of agents, each was allowed to perform only
3000/ steps. So, in agency HRL, agent H performed
1000 steps as did R and L. We chose 3000 steps because
it takes around a minute to perform this number and be-
cause 3000 is perfectly divisible by 2, 3 and 4. The search
was depth limited to complexity 6, and we ran all tests on
a Pentium 500Mhz processor.
Before detailing the results from the test, we report an
unexpected phenomenon which occurred when running
agencies which communicate. We noticed that the num-
ber of categorisations being achieved differed when the
program was run with exactly the same settings for the
same number of theory formation steps. We are still in-
vestigating this, and at present we believe that the Java
thread mechanism cannot be trusted to perform exactly
the same tasks in the same order. This is a problem be-
cause agent L uses a best first search by measuring con-
cepts in relation to the others in the theory. Suppose that
agent L read concept just before it was going to invent
a very interesting concept of its own, . If C was inter-
esting, it would be developed due to the best first nature
of the search. Only after had been developed would
be formed, which leaves less time to develop it. In a
different session, if L read concept just after it invented
, would be developed before , giving more time to
develop and the concepts produced from it.
Thus, because our sessions are limited by the num-
ber of steps allowed, small changes in the timing of the
communication of concepts can make substantial differ-
ences in the theories produced. Without explicitly intro-
ducing stochastic processes, this models to some extent
the way in which luck and serendipity can influence the
development of mathematical theories. Imagine the ad-
vances which would have been made if Fourier had not
lost Galois’ manuscript and had saved him from the fatal







Table 1: Expected number of categorisations for agencies
of different sizes after 3000 steps
duel.3 However interesting the phenomenon is, it makes
testing difficult, and we were forced to average the res-
ults over 10 sessions to compensate for the difference in
theories produced when using a communicating agency.
Figure 2 shows the number of categorisations found
by each agency, with the grey boxes for agencies with no
communication, the black boxes for agencies with imme-
diate communication. These results are fairly conclusive.
In only two immediate communicating agencies contain-
ing a particular agent did the agency containing just that
agent perform better (agency HW performed worse than
H, and LW performed worse than L).
If we average the scores over agencies of the same
size, we can look at the expected number of categorisa-
tions for an agency of a given size. As portrayed in table
1, the most creative agency is the immediate communicat-
ing agency with 4 agents, which slightly outperforms the
average immediate communicating agency with 3 agents.
It is also clear that the increase in creativity is due to the
communication, not just the fact that the system is using
multiple search strategies which cover different areas of
the space. In every case the agency with communication
outperformed the agency without communication.
4.4 Experiment 2 -
Communication Intervals
One way to improve efficiency is to reduce the number of
times concepts are communicated and inboxes are checked.
With the agencies discussed above, after every theory form-
ation step, if a new concept had been produced it was
communicated to the other agents. Similarly, after each
step, every agent checked their inboxes for new concepts,
and read any which produced a new categorisation. Delay-
ing the reading and communicating of concepts until after,
say, every 10th step, will reduce some of the communic-
ation overheads. We tested whether delaying the commu-
nication would affect the creativity of the agency.
We took the best agency from the first experiment,
HRL, and ran it for 100 theory formation sessions. We
increased the waiting time for communication from 1 to
10 to 20, etc. up to 1000 steps and recorded the num-
ber of categorisations it produced after 3000 steps. Again
agents H, R and L each performed 1000 steps. We also re-
corded the number of categorisations which were multi-
3See Stewart (1989) for more details of this tragedy.
Figure 3: Effect of communication intervals on HRL
agency and correlation with multi-agent categorisations
agent. A categorisation is defined to be multi-agent if the
first concept which achieved the categorisation had con-
cepts from more than one agent in its construction his-
tory. As before, we repeated this experiment 10 times
and took an average to counteract the phenomenon de-
scribed above. Figure 3 shows the effect of lengthening
the communication intervals on the total number of cat-
egorisations formed and the number of multi-agent cat-
egorisations formed.
From figure 3, we see that increasing the communica-
tion interval will in general decrease the creativity of the
system, and that the total communication scheme outper-
forms the others significantly. The decrease in creativity
is not smooth, however, and we are presently studying the
theories produced to explain the peaks and troughs ob-
served in this experiment. The correlation between the
total number of categorisations and the number of multi
agent categorisations was more pronounced than we ex-
pected. Judging by the correspondence in the peaks and
troughs on the two graphs, if an opportunity to find multi-
agent categorisations is missed, this is not compensated
by increased time spent by agents searching on their own.
The decrease in quantity of categorisations is due to
our limitation of only 1000 theory formation steps for
each agent. For example, agents in the agency where
communication occurs after the 600th step only commu-
nicate their concepts once, and only those invented before
the 600th step. Any interesting concepts it finds after the
600th step are never communicated. This explains the
long horizontal sections of the graphs in figure 3 - con-
cepts are communicated too late to be used sufficiently to
find multi-agent categorisations. As we see by the end of
the total curve, late introduction of the concepts actually
hinders the creativity of the agency, and when they are
introduced too late to be developed at all, the number of
categorisations increases.
The correlation between the number of categorisations
and the number of multi-agent categorisations, coupled
with the reduction in the number of concepts communic-
ated explains why the creativity of the system declines as
the communication interval increases. Therefore we hy-





Table 2: Expected number of categorisations for agencies
of different sizes after 5 minutes
pothesise that if a system only has a limited number of
steps to perform, the smaller the communication interval,
the more creative the system will be. More experimenta-
tion is required in different theories and with more theory
formation steps to confirm this hypothesis.
4.5 Experiment 3 - Efficiency
Having determined which agencies are the most creative,
we must assess whether this increases the overall effi-
ciency of the system - the ultimate aim of an agency. Due
to the increased overhead in communicating concepts, it
may be that agencies can produce more categorisations in
a given number of steps, but it takes them longer to carry
out those steps because the communication slows down
the process. Of course, it is certainly possible to run each
agent on a different processor which will give efficiency
gains more than compensating for the increased commu-
nication overhead. However, it was useful to test the effi-
ciency of the system as a whole.
We scaled the problem up by running each single agent
agency and each total communicating agency for a dura-
tion of five minutes and comparing the number of cat-
egorisations produced. As before, we averaged the results
for the communicating agencies over 10 sessions. Finally,
we averaged the results over agencies of each size and re-
corded the results in table 2. We see that the multi-agent
agencies are more efficient in general, and we hypothes-
ise that the additional overhead is compensated by the in-
crease in creativity. Again, we plan more experimentation
to further investigate this hypothesis.
4.6 Utility and Clarity
To end our investigation of the exhaustive categorisation
problem, we looked at the utility of each agent - whether
it found any novel categorisation before the other agents.
We found that in every run, each agent contributed at
least one categorisation to the theory. Figure 4 gives the
proportion of categorisations which were first introduced
by each agent for a sample 3000 step session using the
HRLW agency. It also details the proportion of the cat-
egorisations introduced first by each agent which were
multi-agent. We see that agent H introduces half of the
categorisations. This is due to the effectiveness of its
search strategy, and not because H collaborated the most,
as we see from the second pie chart that the number of
multi-agent categorisations introduced by the agents was
roughly equal.
Figure 4: Proportion of (i) all categorisations and (ii)
multi-agent categorisations found by agents in an ex-
ample session with agency HRLW
Agent W does not perform well on this problem and it
seems clear that some aspect of a depth first search needs
to be incorporated. Also, agent W puts concepts it reads
from other agents to the bottom of the agenda, which ex-
plains why it produces no multi-agent categorisations. We
affectionately call agent W the pedantic agent, as it at-
tempts to cover all possibilities thoroughly while its col-
leagues race off in many directions. However, agent W
performs an important function: it improves the clarity of
the theories produced. We can measure the clarity of a
theory as the average number of theory formation steps
required to form a concept from the theory.
A breadth first search will produce the simplest theor-
ies, as it will not build concepts of complexity three before
building all concepts of complexity two and so on. More
than this, as discussed in 2, if a concept is found which
matches one already in the theory and the new concept has
a more concise definition, the simpler definition is kept.
In this way, if agent W reads a concept from another agent
and later finds a more concise definition, the theory will
benefit from the pedantic approach as clearer definitions
for complicated concepts will be produced. We have not
compiled the statistics for the gain in clarity of theories
obtained when agent W is in the agency, but intend to do
so when we run further tests on these agencies.
5 Further Work
Improvements in efficiency could be made by sharing parts
of the agenda between agents, because presently an agent
sending a concept and an agent receiving the concept will
develop it in some identical ways. We also hope to use
agencies to improve the modelling of cross domain theory
formation as discussed in Steel et al. (2000). At present,
to produce cross domain concepts, HR must encourage
the combination of two concepts from different domains.
Considerations also have to be made in the assessment of
the cross domain concepts. We anticipate that using an
agent to produce a theory in each different domain, with
concepts being communicated between agents and hence
across domains will greatly improve the model for cross
domain theory formation.
5.1 Extrapolating Integer Sequences
As described in Colton et al. (2000a), HR has been ad-
apted to perform theory formation in a goal based way
in order to perform machine learning tasks. It is used to
find a concept with examples which match the examples
given by the user. This can be applied to the problem
of extrapolating integer sequences, where the concept to
be learned is a sequence. HR performs a forward chain-
ing search and is equipped with a lookahead mechanism
enabling it to spot when it has found the concepts neces-
sary for the definition. For example, given the sequence
of odd primes, as soon as HR invents odd numbers and
then prime numbers, it looks ahead and notices that their
combination will produce the desired concept.
We are currently experimenting with an agency ap-
proach to sequence extrapolation, motivated by limita-
tions when extrapolating certain sequences. These se-
quences highlight some of the difficulties HR faces:




The first is identified by HR as the sequence of prime
numbers. The other sequences cause more difficulty.
If we calculate the difference between successive terms
of the second sequence, we get the prime numbers again:
2, 3, 5, 7, 11. In IQ tests where sequence extrapola-
tion problems are common, knowledge of this difference
transformation is expected. This transformation is so com-
mon that it suggests tailoring HR’s forward looking mech-
anism to look for either the original sequence or the dif-
ference sequence. This caused many technical problems,
and was a messy solution. Moreover, in future versions of
HR we hope to make the search more goal directed, us-
ing the examples supplied to explicitly direct the search.
In this case, as the original and difference sequence are
often so different there will be a conflict in the search
strategies. Therefore, we are experimenting with a multi-
agent approach to sequence learning, where two agents
are employed, one to look for the original sequence and
the other to look for the difference sequence. The model
is certainly much neater and works well. We are still test-
ing whether multi-agent model is more efficient than the
single-agent model, but initial findings are encouraging.
If we now look at the third sequence and take 99 from
each term, we get: 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, which is the prime se-
quence for the third time. This is not, however, a common
transformation, and there are too many similar transform-
ation to reasonably dedicate an agent to the output from
each one. A better model is to take each concept pro-
duced and determine which, if any, transformation from a
family of transformations would produce the desired se-
quence. For example, when HR invents the concept of
prime numbers, it could look at the family of transform-
ations which add on a particular number to every term in
the sequence. To get from the first term of the prime se-
quence it has just invented to the first term of the target
sequence, it needs to add on 99. It would then determine
that adding 99 is the desired transformation.
We are presently testing whether it is more efficient
to have a single agent attempting to identify the correct
transformation. This agent takes the concepts from the
other agents which could possibly be transformed and
attempts to find the correct transformation. Again, the
model works well, and we are assessing whether this is
efficient. We cannot possibly hope to cover all possible
sequences which an inventive person could produce, but
we do hope to show that the agent based approach im-
proves the coverage of the system.
6 Conclusions
Adapting HR to employ a multi-agent approach is a nat-
ural way to extend its theory formation abilities. Agen-
cies equipped with a method for communication of con-
cepts and selection of concepts better model the way in
which collaborative research progresses in science than
single programs running in isolation. In Furse (1990), the
author proposes a network of theory formation programs
each communicating their most interesting concepts to the
programs on the network. This is a good model, and sim-
ilar to the one we have implemented. However, in our
model, each agent communicates all its concepts to the
others, but will assess a concept on its own terms rather
than accepting the assessment of the sending agent. In
this way, a concept which seems dull to one agent may be
picked up and fruitfully utilised by another.
Machine learning programs such as Progol, Muggleton
(1995), are asked to find a single concept which classifies
the examples supplied correctly. Therefore, among other
ways, success can be measured by the number of concepts
it can learn from a predefined set. It is more difficult to
perform a quantitative assessment of a theory formation
program, because the goal is to find many interesting con-
cepts and obtain some understanding of the domain. We
have chosen to measure the number of different ways a set
of examples can be categorised by a theory to determine
the quality of the theory and accordingly developed a way
to compare the creativity of different systems.
We have demonstrated that a multi-agent approach
can increase the creativity and efficiency of a system, even
before any advantage is gained from running each agent
in parallel. Autonomous intelligent agents have emerged
over the last decade as an important technique to solve
many interesting problems, and improve efficiency in many
areas, Jennings and Wooldridge (1997). We have shown
that theory formation programs can benefit from an agent
based approach. We also hope to demonstrate that the the-
ory formation agencies we plan to implement in the future
will apply fruitfully to other areas of artificial intelligence
such as machine learning and theorem proving.
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